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International Sanctions in Theory and Practice
by Margaret Doxey*
I. INMODUCTON
A s necessary and useful measures in situations where states contem-
"plate or actually adopt policies which violate their international obli-
gations and endanger community values, international sanctions have
been the subject of intermittent public and scholarly debate for over 60
years.1 While both the League of Nations Covenant and the United Na-
tions Charter directed sanctions at the unlawful use of force,2 in the
United Nations context sanctions have also been linked to the defense of
human rights,3 but until 1979 few instances of the use of sanctions were
on the record. The short list included League of Nations sanctions against
Italy in 1935-36, U.N. sanctions against Rhodesia/Zimbabwe from 1966-79
and an arms embargo against South Africa since 1977.1 In the past three
years, however, western governments have imposed penalties against Iran,
the Soviet Union, Poland and Argentina. 5 These cases provide a wealth of
new material for analyzing the efficacy of economic sanctions in achieving
their goals and of the the costs incurred by initiating and third states as
well as by the target(s). They also raise questions about trends and pat-
terns in resort to collective measures, particularly the extent to which
these measures can be said to have authoritative status and support com-
munity values. It is to the latter questions that this paper is mainly ad-
dressed. It seeks to explore the relationship between theory, in the sense
of a developing set of ideas about sanctions, and practice, proceeding
* Professor of Political Studies, Trent University, Ontario. B.Sc., Ph.D., University of
London.
I Discussion of theoretical aspects of sanctions was particularly active in the early years
of both the League of Nations and the United Nations, and analysis of their practicability
has drawn heavily on the Rhodesian experience. For a select bibliography see M. DoxEY,
ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL ENFORCEMENT (2d ed. 1980).
2 LEAGUE OF NATIONS CovNANT art. 16; U.N. CHARTER arts. 41 and 42.
3 Discussed infra.
4 There have also been some regional programs of diplomatic and economic pressure,
notably the measures imposed on Cuba by the Organization of American States (OAS) from
1962-75.
5 Discussed infra.
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from a very brief restatement of the theory behind League and U.N. sanc-
tions and analysis of its inherent weaknesses, to a discussion of actual
cases and the lessons of experience.
II. SANCTIONS IN THEORY
As penalties which may be incurred as a consequence of norm viola-
tion, sanctions must relate to norms or rules, must be capable of applica-
tion and must carry some negative power, whether symbolic or real. Fail-
ure to meet these minimum conditions would make them absurd. If
sanctions are to have the character of legal penalties, their imposition
should also have some authorized basis. This immediately compounds the
problem at the international level where authority is conspicuously
absent.
The idea embodied in the League of Nations Covenant and carried
forward in the U.N. Charter, that a new and more peaceful world order
would be created if states accepted restraints on their conduct by com-
mitting themselves to settling disputes by negotiation or arbitration
rather than by force, included provisions for collective measures (sanc-
tions) which would be authorized by the League or the United Nations if
the rules were broken.6 The threat of sanctions was expected to act as a
deterrent while imposition would bring conformity. In the League Cove-
nait, sanctions were to be an automatic response to a breach of its rules7
and members were immediately to sever all relations with the offending
state.' However, this commitment was quickly diluted9 and only fulfilled
once in the half-hearted application of sanctions against Italy following
its invasion of Ethiopia.10 In the U.N. Charter, the Security Council has
the authority to order sanctions to meet a threat to or a breach of the
peace or in response to an act of aggression,"' and members are bound to
carry out its decisions.12 The Security Council can also recommend sanc-
tions.1 s Moreover, in contrast to the narrow basis for sanctions in the
League Covenant,14 the grounds for U.N. sanctions are potentially very
6 The word "sanction" does not feature in the text of the League Covenant or the U.N.
Charter although it has always been used to describe the measures envisaged.
7 LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT arts. 12, 13 and 15.
8 Id. art 16.
9 Cf. the Interpretative Resolutions passed by the Assembly in 1921 and accepted by
the Council as guidelines for action in connection with art. 16.
10 See DoxEY, supra note 1; G.W. BAER, THE COMING OF THE ITALO-ETHOPIAN WAR
(1967).
,1 U.N. CHARTER art. 39.
" U.N. CHARTER art. 25.
Is U.N. CHARTER art. 39.
14 E.g. failure to wait for three months after a Council report before going to war - the
technical breach of the Covenant for which Italy was punished in 1935.
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broad. The prerequisite for the use of sanctions is agreement between all
permanent members and at least four non-permanent members of the Se-
curity Council. 15
Although subordinate to the Security Council, the General Assembly
is not precluded from ruling on instances of norm-violation. At its annual
sessions and at emergency sessions,16 the General Assembly has the power
to condemn unacceptable behavior and recommend sanctions by a two-
thirds majority vote.17
Not surprisingly, from the earliest days of the League, attention fo-
cussed on non-military measures as sanctions. Political and economic
sanctions were thought capable of generating enough coercive power to be
effective as a deterrent or penalty and as appropriate for an international
body concerned with the prevention of war rather than its extension.18
Similar reasoning has influenced U.N. thinking and the failure to provide
for U.N. forces under Article 43 of the U.N. Charter means that political
and economic measures are the most severe which the Security Council
can order. These League and U.N. collective measures were designed as
part of a collective security system for which some sacrifices would be
necessary. Sanctions were expected to serve wider community interests of
peace and good order and not the national interests of individual states.
Sanctions would not be cost free.1'
But as part of a new order, the theory of collective security X.ith
sanctions as penalties for international delinquency did not address the
problem of peaceful change. In the lifetime of the League, the aspirations
of Germany, Italy and Japan prompted their ultimate resort to force, and
force has been used on numerous occasions since World War II. The
United Nations, however, has brought developments in norm creation di-
rected at the correction of perceived inequities in the international sys-
tem. Besides prescriptions for peaceful settlement of disputes, the U.N.
Charter emphasis ideas of economic and social justice.20 For Third World
States who now constitute more than two-thirds of the U.N. membership,
"U.N. CHARTER art. 27.
"These are called under the Uniting for Peace Resolution, G.A. Res. 377(V), 7 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 20) at 10, U.N. Doc.. A/1775 (1950).
17 Id. at 11.
18 See, for instance, Sir Anton Bertram's comments on the value of economic sanctions
in Bertram, The Economic Weapon as a Form of Peaceful Pressure, in 17 TRANSACTIONS OF
THE GROTIUS SocIry 141 (1932).
20 LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 16, para. 3, and U.N. CHARTER art. 50, provide
skeletal provisions for burden-sharing.
20 Article 55 sets out principles of human rights to which members pledge their sup-
port. There has been a progressive elaboration of these principles in UN Declarations and
UN-sponsored conventions, starting with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in
1948 and including the important International Covenants on Economic, Social and Cul-
tural Rights and on Civil and Political Rights of 1966.
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group norms, which delegitimize colonialism and racial discrimination
and support self-determination, have been particularly important.21
While confusion exists when, for instance, the right to self-determination
conflicts with the territorial integrity of states,22 the overall effect has
been to extend international standards. Adherents to the International
Covenants on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and Civil and Politi-
cal Rights, or other international treaties concerning human rights, have
incurred binding obligations, and even if General Assembly resolutions do
not have the force of law, it might be thought that unopposed resolutions
and declarations would impose some moral obligations on members to act
in accordance with their precepts. 8 It is also open to the Security Council
to determine that a failure to live up to any of these international stan-
dards constitutes a threat to the peace.24
In theory, then, the United Nations has identified universal norms
supporting peace and human rights, and offers protections which can be
activated in their defense. The U.N. Charter even provides for regional
enforcement action with the Security Council acting as the authorizing
body.25
III. SANCTIONS IN PRACTICE
The impracticality of the design outlined above has always been ap-
parent, and it hardly needs stating that in practice the system has not
worked. Collective security was a myth and the foreign policy goals of the
major powers, even those which had been allies during each of the two
world wars, quickly took divergent paths. The League of Nations suffered
from major absentees and defections. The United Nations has achieved
virtual universality but deep divisions between members along East-West
and North-South lines severely limit any likelihood of agreement on norm
violation. Further, because of the veto power, the superpowers and other
permanent members of the Security Council as well as their friends and
clients are protected from mandatory sanctions; there is no deterrent ef-
fect.2 6 Rhodesia provides the only major instance of mandatory economic
sanctions in U.N. history.
In theory, international sanctions, as distinct from acts of self-de-
22 See, e.g., G.A. Res. 1514, 15 U.N. GAOR Supp.(No.16) at 66, U.N. Doc. A/4685
(1960); G.A. Res. 1904, 18 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.15) at 35, U.N. Doc. A/5515 (1963).
22 G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970).
33 See, Bowett, Economic Coercion and Reprisals by States, 13 VA. J. INT'L L. 1 (1972).
11 U.N. CHARTER art. 34.
35 U.N. CHARTER art. 53.
I" See Baldwin, Power Analysis and World Politics, in 31 WORLD POLITICS, 161-94,
(1979), where the point is well made that probability as well as impact is relevant to calcula-
tions about the use of power.
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fense, should be authorized within the framework of international organi-
zation. In practice, unauthorized measures have become increasingly fre-
quent and the implications of this development are explored further
below. Practice also has revealed that economic penalties do not necessa-
rily bring compliance.
Rhodesia, an apparently vulnerable target, not only benefited from
South Africa's (and, until 1974, Portugal's) non-participation in sanctions
but also from serious weaknesses in implementation of the sanctions by
participants. Application was partial and gradual and official tolerance of
sanctions evasion existed, even in Britain.27 Although the sanctions were
not without some effect and the universal non-recognition of the regime
of Ian Smith compounded its external and internal difficulties, Rhodesia
displayed a surprising degree of political defiance and economic resili-
ence. Sanctions were either circumvented or tolerated. In the long run,
the civil war and the loss of South African support were more damaging
than the U.N. sanctions. And the cost to innocent states, particularly
Zambia, increased concern about the spillover effects of international eco-
nomic penalties on this scale.2s
The Rhodesian case also showed that a difficult task faces states im-
posing sanctions to remedy situations where governments are denying
human rights to their own citizens. Diplomatic, political and cultural
sanctions will be mutually inconvenient, and economic measures which
interfere with normal trade and investment patterns over a long period
can be quite costly to sustain. Sanctions imposed for an extended period
of time give the target the opportunity to devise and implement strategies
which overcome the effect of such measures. Moreover, backsliding, sec-
ond thoughts, and pressure from adversely affected interest groups, can
all be confidently predicted within the sanctioning states where, in hard
economic times, reluctance to forego profitable foreign trade and invest-
ment will certainly be greater.
Given the weaknesses of mandatory sanctions revealed by the Rhode-
sian experience, it is obvious that sanctions imposed on a voluntary basis
following a General Assembly resolution will be even less effective. Such
resolutions can identify norm-violations and lend some authority to mea-
sures which are then adopted - although this authority may be con-
tested and is certainly undermined by selectivity in condemnation. 29 But,
' See Bingham & Gray, Report on Supply of Petroleum and Petroleum Products to
Rhodesia, London HMSO, Sept. 1978; Reports of the Security Council Sanctions Commit-
tee, 1968-1979.
's See COMMONWEALTH SECRETARIAT, THE FRONT LINE STATES: THE BURDEN OF THE LI-
ERATION STRUGGLE (1978).
" And perhaps too by procedural devices, not provided for in the U.N. Charter, such as
preventing South Africa from participating in the work of the General Assembly by refusing
to accept the credentials of the South African delegation. Articles 5 and 6 permit suspension
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in practical terms, resort to the General Assembly follows lack of agree-
ment in the Security Council and therefore implies the existence of at
least one important source of support for the target. There indeed may
have been a cumulative symbolic effect from the repeated condemnation
of South Africa by the General Assembly, but western powers have not
heeded General Assembly calls for sanctions.30 In fact, the continuing
threat of economic sanctions spurred the South African government to
build up its defenses.
A further development in practice, resulting from deadlock in the Se-
curity Council, was to allow regional organizations much more freedom to
define and defend regional norms than was contemplated in the U.N.
Charter. However, regional non-military measures have proved generally
ineffective as a means of reversing situations and policies within the tar-
get which are deemed unacceptable by the rest of the group. Cuba pro-
vides a good example. In spite of an OAS declaration in 1962 that a
Marxist-Leninist government could not be part of the Inter-American
system s" and the diplomatic and trade sanctions imposed in 1964, Castro
remains in power and internal economic problems have not prevented
Cuban troops from venturing as far afield as Africa in support of
likeminded regimes. The OAS sanctions were eventually lifted in 1975,2
although unilateral U.S. measures remain in force.33 As long as substan-
tial extra-regional support is forthcoming, such measures can hardly be
decisive.
From regional sanctions which have an ideological motivation, it is a
short step to negative measures adopted by states for similar reasons but
outside the framework of international organization. The failure of the
United Nations to act also may make measures of self-help necessary fol-
lowing a breach of legal obligations. Allies and friends of the injured
party may also adopt punitive measures in its support. The indiscrimi-
nate use of the term "sanction" to cover any or all of these forms of be-
havior is unfortunate and tends to dilute its meaning. To call measures
"sanctions" is to invest them with an aura of authority, but there is dan-
ger that the line between authorized and non-authorized measures may
become completely blurred and that any injurious act of foreign policy
and expulsion of members on an Assembly vote with Security Council backing.
30 The western powers have observed the Security Council's mandatory arms embargo,
S.C. Res. 418, 32 U.N. SCOR (2046th mtg.) at 5, U.N. Doc. SIINF/33 (1977).
31 Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs (8th), Punta del Este, Jan
1962, Final Act, Washington D.C., Pan American Union. OEAISer. C/fl.8.
82 Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs (16th), San Jose, July 1975,
Final Act, Washington D.C., Pan American Union, OEA/Ser. C/11.16.
33 For a statement of U.S. objectives which included demonstrating to "the people of
Cuba.. .that the present regime cannot serve their interests .. " see DEPT. OF STATE,
AMERICAN FOREuN POLICY: CuRnRNT DocuMENTs 1964, at 323, 324 (1967).
Vol. 15:273
INTERNATIONAL SANCTIONS
may be so described.
The four most recent cases of group penalties-those against Iran,
the Soviet Union, Poland and Argentina-have all been adopted outside
an international organizational framework, and a brief account of the sali-
ent features of each will help to build a picture of current trends in state
practice.
A. The Tehran Hostage Incidents
The seizure in Tehran of the U.S. embassy and 52 hostages by Ira-
nian militants on November 4, 1979, ushered in 14 months of intense and
varied diplomatic efforts to negotiate their release with the Iranian gov-
ernment. These negotiations ended in success on January 20, 1981, the
day of President Reagan's inauguration."
The norm violation in this case was not in doubt, despite Iran's
claims of prior and prolonged U.S. wrongdoing.35 Time-honored interna-
tional customary law regarding the immunity of diplomatic personnel and
property had been codified in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Re-
lations to which Iran was a party.36 On November 9, 1979, the Security
Council by unanimous vote called for the release of the hostages 37 and
subsequently threatened "effective measures,"38 but a U.S.-sponsored res-
olution for economic sanctions was vetoed by the Soviet Union on Janu-
ary 13, 1980.39 The International Court of Justice (ICJ) also called for the
release of the hostages in its Order for provisional measures of December
15, 197940 and upheld the U.S. case in its judgement. 1 Meanwhile, the
"The intervening period had brought recourse to the International Court of Justice
(ICJ) by the United States, a visit to Iran by U.N. Secretary-General Waldheim, an abortive
U.N. rescue attempt, Algerian good offices which were instrumental in the resolution of the
crisis, and diplomatic and economic measures against Iran imposed by the United States
and some of its allies.
" Iran's claims were set out in letters to the International Court reproduced in its Or-
der of Dec. 15, 1979, 1979 LC.J. 10-11, and its Judgement of May 24, 1980, 1980 I.C.J. 8-9.
36 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, April 18, 1961, 500 U.N.T.S. 96. The
United States and Iran were also parties to the Convention on the Prevention and Punish-
ment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, De-
cember 14, 1973, 28 U.S.T. 1975, T.I.A.S. No. 8532.
37 S.C. Res. 457, 34 U.N. SCOR (2178th mtg.) at 24, U.N. Doc. S/INF/35 (1979).
" S.C. Res. 461, 34 U.N. SCOR (2184th mtg.) at 24, U.N. Doc. S/INF/35 (1979).
" The Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Bangladesh and Kuwait had abstained on Sec.
Council Res. 461 of December 31, 1979 which threatened 'effective measures'; the US-spon-
sored draft resolution for sanctions was opposed by the Soviet Union and East Germany.
China did not participate and Mexico and Bangladesh abstained. The Soviet Union claimed
that the issue was a bilateral one between the United States and Iran.
40 1979 LC.J. 10-11.
" See Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran
(United States of America v. Iran), 1980 LC.J. 3.
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United States had progressively adopted measures penalizing Iran, and
called on its allies to do likewise. U.S. measures included: the freezing of
Iranian assets and their inventorization with a view to possible confisca-
tion; a ban on imports of Iranian oil and later, on all imports from and
exports to Iran (excepting food and medicine); withdrawal of Iranian
visas; a ban on travel to Iran; and the severance of diplomatic relations. 42
It was to be expected that the United States would respond to the
Iranian government's failure to live up to its international obligations. 3
For other states, measures against Iran would register disapproval for its
behavior. Third World countries were not willing to adopt such measures,
and western governments were also reluctant to do so, despite U.S. pres-
sure. In April 1980, European Community members and certain other
countries, including Japan and Norway, imposed limited trade restric-
tions, but diplomatic relations were not severed.""
It is obvious that the protection of diplomats is of basic importance
to all states, irrespective of enmities or friendships, and this was reflected
in the Security Council's unanimous call for the rblease of the hostages.
Opinions were divided, however, on the merits of drastic penalties and
the Soviet Union was not the only country to oppose them. Iran was in
the throes of revolution, and there was concern about making the situa-
tion worse rather than better. In the west, too, concern was publicly aired
that financial measures could have undesirable effects on confidence and
stability for western banks: freezing Iranian assets could precipitate wide-
spread withdrawal of deposits with serious consequences.45 Reaction to
the crisis in Iran was further complicated by the concurrent crisis in Af-
ghanistan which is discussed in the next section.
B. Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan
Soon after the seizure of the hostages in Tehran came Soviet military
intervention in Afghanistan in December 1979. A pro-Moscow regime had
been in power in Kabul since April 1978 but serious internal unrest had
developed. Soviet forces installed a new leader, Babrak Karmal, and
brought Afghanistan, a third world country which had preserved some
semblance of independence, fully into the Soviet sphere of influence.
At an emergency session of the General Assembly in January 1980, a
heavily supported motion of condemnation reflected Third World concern
42 U.S. measures were progressively announced between January and April 1980.
"3 But see the comments on the U.S. rescue attempt in the ICJ judgment, supra note
41, at paras. 93-94.
44 The two-stage plan adopted by the Ten European Community members is reported
in KE sING'S CONTEMPORARY ARCHIVES 30530-1 (Oct. 24, 1980).
45 See Carswell, Economic Sanctions and the Iranian Experience, 60 FOREIGN AFF.
247-65 (1981-82).
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about Soviet action but there was no recommendation for sanctions.4 s No
Security Council action was possible over the Soviet veto.
For the United States and its allies this extension of Soviet power
southwards, outside its East European sphere of influence, was most un-
welcome in the global strategic context, and it also posed a possible threat
to Middle East oil supplies. In his State of the Union message on January
23, 1980 President Carter specifically declared the Gulf area to be a vital
interest to the United States.47 Earlier in the month, he had announced a
series of unilateral measures to signal disapproval of the Soviet resort to
military intervention, contrary to U.N. Charter principles. s The SALT H
treaty was shelved. Other measures included a limited grain embargo, a
proposed ban on participation in the Moscow Summer Olympics, with-
drawal of Soviet fishing privileges in U.S. waters and a ban on the export
to the U.S.S.R. of high technology.49 U.S. allies were urged to take similar
action, but only Britain offered prompt backing for the U.S. position. Its
government terminated preferential credit arrangements with the Soviet
Union, curtailed ministerial and cultural exchanges and officially en-
dorsed the Olympic boycott.50 France and West Germany were opposed
to penalties and the NATO Council failed to agree on collective mea-
sures.51 In the United States the farmers bitterly resented the grain em-
bargo and the Republican Presidential candidate, Ronald Reagan, prom-
ised to lift it if he were elected.52 The Soviet Union, meanwhile, made up
the shortage of grain from other sources, notably Argentina, and the
Olympics proceeded, albeit with less than full participation.
The United Nations could not proceed beyond General Assembly
condemnation in this case. Outside the U.N. framework the pressure ex-
erted by the United States on its allies for the imposition of punitive
measures seemed at least as heavy as any pressure exerted on the Soviet
Union by the measures themselves. There is an obvious danger that
where one power applies penalties unilaterally and then finds that other
disagree, its actions will thereby forfeit status as well as efficacy. This
46 Res. E-6/2 called for the withdrawal of all Soviet troops. This was the sixth occasion
when the Uniting for Peace Procedure had been used. Voting was 104 to 18 with 18 absten-
tions. The Soviet position was supported by Angola, Cuba, Ethopia and Mozambique as well
as East European governments. Romania abstained. See G.A. Res. ES-6/2, U.N. GAOR
Sixth Emergency Special Session Supp. (No. 11) at 5, U.N. Doc. A/ES-617 (1980).
' 
7 State of the Union Address, Pun. PAPERS 195 (1980-81).
"8 Shipments of Agricultural Commodities to Soviet Union, Pun. PAPERS 183-188 (1980-
81).
41 See N.Y. Times, Jan. 5, 1980, at 1, col. 6.
11 See The Times (London), Jan. 29, 1980, at 1, col. 1. British athletes defied their
government's wishes and participated in the Olympics.
81 For an analysis of East-West trade relations and their relative importance to the U.S.
and Western Europe, see S. WOOLCOCK, WESTERN PoLICIES ON EAST-WEST TRADE (1982).
2 This promise was carried out in April 1981.
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point and its implications for the west will be taken up in the concluding
section.
C. Poland
The growing struggle in Poland between the independent Trade
Union Solidarity and the Communist regime raised the twin specters of a
collapse of order and of Soviet military intervention in 1981. On Decem-
ber 13, 1981 the Polish military took control of the government and de-
clared martial law, suspending Solidarity and detaining its leaders."
Although martial law brought the harsh curtailment of civil liberties
in Poland, international norm violation was doubtful in this case. No
U.N. action was possible, but the Reagan administration responded
promptly to developments in Poland. While the grain embargo against
the Soviet Union was not reimposed, negotiations for a new long-term
agreement on grain were (temporarily) shelved; Aeroflot flights to the
United States were suspended, and Soviet maritime rights were re-
stricted. Further, the ban on exports of high technology to the U.S.S.R.,
including equipment for the Siberian gas pipeline, was intensified." Mea-
sures against Poland included the withdrawal of aviation and fishing priv-
ileges and the suspension of food aid and Export-Import Bank credits.5
Again the allies were pressed to join the United States and again
they proved unwilling. Britain imposed some limited diplomatic and eco-
nomic measures early in February 1982, as did some other countries in-
cluding Canada and Japan, but generally the European view differed
sharply from that of the United States. Foreign Ministers of the Euro-
pean Community agreed not to undermine the U.S. measures, 6 but
France and West Germany rejected economic measures against the Soviet
Union unless it intervened directly in Poland. While deploring the loss of
libertie's in Poland, European governments were anxious to avoid making
the situation worse. In general, the concern was to preserve East-West
links and some remnants of detente. On the specific issue of the pipeline,
there was a felt need to diversify energy sources and to protect the con-
siderable investment and employment advantages it offered.
European recalcitrance prompted the U.S. administration to promul-
gate further regulations banning the export of oil and gas-related equip-
ment and components and technology by U.S. foreign firms to the Soviet
" These events were fully reported in the press of December 1981.
" See Contemporary ]Practice of the United States-Economic Sanctions, 76 AM. J.
INT'L L. 379-84 (1982).
"Id.
Final Communiqu6, Meeting of Foreign Ministers of the Economic Community, Jan-
uary 4, 1982. See KEEsING'S CoNTEmpoRARY ARcfv 31457B (Apr. 30, 1982).
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Union, except with the permission of the U.S. Government.57 This action
caused consternation among the allies. Canada protested the infringe-
ment of its sovereignty" while West European governments ordered firms
within their jurisdiction to defy the ban and make deliveries under ex-
isting contracts."' In response, the U.S. Government blacklisted these
firms from receiving oil and gas equipment, technology and services from
U.S. sources.60
While a case certainly exists for sustaining diplomatic pressure on
the Polish and Soviet governments to live up to human rights pledges,
including those embodied in the Helsinki Find Act, there is no legal basis
for sanctions against either government. Retaliation for martial law in
Poland, the desire to hurt the Soviet economy and deny it hard currency
and the dangers of undue energy dependence on Soviet natural gas do not
represent the imposition of sanctions in defense of universal norms.61
D. The Falklands crisis
A crisis of a different nature was precipitated on April 2, 1982 when
Argentine forces seized the Falkland Islands, a British dependency long
claimed by Argentina as part of its own territory as Las Malvinas.2 Pre-
vious negotiations over the future of the island between Britain and Ar-
gentina had not produced an acceptable solution, but, irrespective of the
validity of competing claims, Argentina's action was a clear violation of
Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter which bans unilateral resort to force.
Britain immediately dispatched a naval task force to the South At-
lantic as an act of self-defense and on April 7, 1982, proclaimed a 200-
mile exclusion zone around the islands.6 3 It also imposed a range of non-
'7 See Financial Times, June 19, 1982. This was done under the Export Administration
Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-72, 93 Stat. 503 (codified at 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-2420 (Supp.
IV 1980)).
See Dept. of External Affairs (Ottawa) Comminiqu6 No. 121 (Aug. 9, 1982).
' N.Y. Times, July 23, 1982 at 1, col. 1.
60 These events were fully reported in the press in August and September 1982. See,
e.g., N.Y. Times, Aug. 25, 1982 at AI, col. 4; Aug. 26, 1982 at Al, col. 4; Aug. 27, 1982 at Al,
col. 4.
"1 These explanations of U.S. measures were cited in the Financial Times of August 27,
1982 and described as a "confusing rag-bag of generalizations." Moreover, the sweeping na-
ture of the June 1982 regulations raised questions about extraterritoriality, the legality of
the cancellation of partially executed contracts and the general standing of western firms as
credible suppliers which, as cogently pointed out in a Note from the European Community
to the U.S. government, do a great deal of harm to the west. The full text of the Note
Verbale and supporting argument can be found in Europe, Documents, AGENCE INTERNATIO-
NALE D'INFORISION POUR LA PREsSa N. 1216, Aug. 12, 1982.
62 See Myhre, Title to the Falklands-Malvinas Under International Law in 12 Mm-
LENNIUM: JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDms 25-38 (1983).
"See N.Y. Times, Apr. 4, 1982, at A-1, col. 1.
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military measures including the freezing of Argentine assets in Britain
and embargoes on trade and financial transactions with Argentina."
Efforts were made to reach a negotiated settlement of the crisis
through the good offices first of U.S. Secretary of State Haig and then of
the U.N. Secretary-General. Britain had also taken the issue to the Secur-
ity Council, calling an emergency meeting when the Argentine invasion
seemed imminent, and it received support for the principle of peaceful
settlement (but not for its own military action or for its own claims) in
the form of Security Council Resolution 502 of April 3, 1982, which deter-
mined that a breach of the peace existed in the area and demanded an
immediate cessation of hostilities, the withdrawal of Argentine forces and
a diplomatic solution.s The Soviet Union abstained on this vote and the
British government did not press further for U.N. sanctions, perhaps
judging that a Soviet veto would undermine rather than strengthen Brit-
ain's case . 6 Commonwealth support of Britain was forthcoming and its
European Community partners showed solidarity by imposing embargoes
on arms sales to and imports from Argentina. The trade embargoes were
initially of one month's duration but were renewed on May 16, 1982, by
all members except Ireland and Italy.67 , At the end of April, after Mr.
Haig's efforts to bring a settlement had failed, the United States also im-
posed some limited measures against Argentina and made its support for
Britain clear.68 Meanwhile, Argentina imposed counter-measures and
sought help from the OAS but was unable to muster more than rhetorical
support for its position, with Chile, Trinidad, Tobago and the United
States in opposition. 9
On May 20, the British Prime Minister announced that diplomatic
negotiations at the United Nations had failed and withdrew all offers
from the negotiating table. In the following weeks the Falkland Islands
were recaptured by British forces. The Argentine commander surrendered
on June 14, 1982; his troops were taken prisoner and later repatriated.
Sanctions are being lifted in stages, and the process is not complete as of
this writing. However, Britain and Argentina reciprocally lifted financial
measures on September 14, 1982, paving thel way for help from the Inter-
national Monetary Fund for Argentina's troubled economy.70
6Id.
:5 Voting was 10 to 1 (Panama), with, Poland, Spain and the USSR abstaining.
88 Britain (and the United States) later vetoed a resolution calling for a further attempt
by the Secretary-General to exercise good offices.
67 See KEESING'S CoNTEMPoRARY ARcHVEs 31532 (June 11, 1982); id. at 31713B (Sept.
24, 1982).
" Statement by Secretary of State Haig at a press conference on April 30, 1982.
6, Connell-Smith, The OAS and the Falklands Conflict, 38 THF WORLD TODAY 340,
345-46 (1982).
70 Comment in THE EcONOMIST, Sept. 14, 1982, at 90.
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The Falklands crisis was precipated by force and ended by force.
Non-military measures were ancillary. No sanctions were authorized by
the United Nations although Argentina's failure to obey Resolution 502
left it in a weak position to counter the moral force of the economic mea-
sures which were widely adopted against it.
IV. WHITHER SANCTIONS?
What trends or patterns in the resort to collective non-military mea-
sures can be discerned from the record of U.N. and state practice out-
lined above? The failure of the United Nations to establish authority and
consistency in identifying norm-violation was predictable, given great
power rivalry and the existence of the veto. In practice, however, crisis
situations where superpowers and their clients are not directly involved
as potential "wrongdoers" have produced Security Council responses
which do not follow a straightforward Chapter 7 enforcement procedure.
The sequence of identifying an Article 39-type situation and then order-
ing penalties to deal with it has been followed only in the cases of Rhode-
sia and South Africa - where the arms trade itself was deemed a threat
to the peace7 1 An alternative option is for the Security Council to avoid
invoking Article 39. It can call on the offending state to end the crisis
itself (for instance, calling on Iran to release the U.S. hostages) or recom-
mend measures to U.N. members (as in the earlier call for a voluntary
arms embargo against South Africa in 1963).72 Another procedure is to*
determine that an Article 39-type situation exists but make no order or
recommendation for sanctions. Thus in the Falklands crisis a determina-
tion that a breach of the peace 'had occurred was not accompanied or
followed by calls for sanctions. It is open to discussion whether measures
adopted voluntarily by U.N. members following a Security Council call
for action which is ignored by an offending state have more legitimacy if
there has been no accompanying or subsequent call for sanctions than if
their imposition has been vetoed by one permanent number of the Secur-
ity Council.
Severance of the link between norm-violation and consequent penal-
ties is also possible for the General Assembly as was apparent in the Af-
ghanistan crisis. But the active role of the General Assembly in promot-
ing norm development in the field of human rights has not been
71 S.C. Res. 418, supra note 30. In the case of North Korea, during the absence of the
Soviet Union from the Security Council, the United States was able to secure passage of
Sec. Council Res. 82 of June 25, and 83 of June 27, 1950, which determined a breach of the
peace had occurred and recommended that military measures should be taken to assist
South Korea. No repetition of this situation was likely.
71 S.C. Res. 181, 18 U.N. SCOR (1056th mtg.) at 7, U.N. Doc. S/INF/18/Rev. 1 (1963);
S.C. Res. 182, 18 U.N. SCOR (1078th mtg.) at 8, U.N. Doc. S/INT/18/Rev. 1 (1963).
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paralleled by the development of the General Assembly as an alternative
to the Security Council in making authoritative rulings on norm-violation.
A two-thirds majority vote condemning wrongdoing and/or recom-
mending sanctions, whether mustered by the United States against the
People's Republic of China in the early days of the United Nations or by
third world states against white regimes in Southern Africa in more re-
cent times, is not binding on the dissenting third. Even though a strong
General Assembly vote of condemnation can carry a symbolic message,
and repeated condemnation presumably builds some cumulative strength,
the General Assembly's authority has been weakened by what Klaus
Knorr accurately described as "the discriminatory manner in which nor-
mative constraints have been brought into play. '73
In place of authoritative U.N. judgments there are individual or
group judgments about norm-violation and appropriate retaliatory action,
possibly formulated inside, but more commonly outside, the framework of
a limited-membership organization. These judgments may have regional
backing and therefore enjoy some limited authoritative status, but they
are open to challenge from other states who can also mitigate the effects
of penalties on the target.
If the failure of the United Nations to provide an authoritative
framework for sanctions and the consequent development of unautho-
rized ad hoc responses is a fact of international life, the record of state
practice must also raise questions about the merits of economic penalties
per se. They are less lethal than resort to force but they can prove very
costly to all parties without achieving impressive results. The limited suc-
cess of the Arab oil embargoes of 1973 and '1974, which were in no sense
international sanctions, does not provide convincing evidence to the con-
trary. In that case there was a combination of exceptional control over a
vital resource and a limited objective of influencing western governments
to adopt a foreign policy posture more favorable to the Arab cause. The
four cases described briefly in this paper illustrate the danger of the
"backlash" and "ripple" effects of economic measures, not only for those
imposing them and for innocent third states, but also for the interna-
tional economy as a whole. The consequences for international confidence
and monetary stability of freezing Iranian assets or of forcing Poland or
Argentina into massive default on foreign loans have not escaped western
commentators."'
Economic sanctions have come to be widely regarded with skepticism
and even alarm. Yet, if they are so demonstrably inefficient and costly,
why are they imposed? Presumably governments will continue to feel the
" Knorr, Is International Coercion Waning or Rising?, 1 INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 98
(1977).
74 See Carswell, supra note 45.
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need to react to the behavior of others when their own interests are di-
rectly and adversely affected, and superpowers can define their own inter-
ests very broadly. There also can be an intention to convey an image of
purposeful leadership to the domestic audience as well as a signal to other
powers that they cannot act with complete impunity. There may indeed
be an electoral payoff, and the warning may be taken seriously by other
governments. Both the United States and Britain have pursued these
goals and achieved such results by their response to the events described,
but they have incurred costs in so doing. And, measures presented as de-
fending international interest and called "sanctions" may be perceived as
defending particular national interests which are not shared by other
states.
7 5
U.S. measures against the Soviet Union, linked by Administration
spokesmen to events in Poland, represent a re-intensification of the con-
trols on East-West economic relations which have existed since the late
1940's but which were progressively relaxed in the years of detente. Coor-
dinated by COCOM, a NATO committee, these measures sought to pre-
vent, or at least to hinder, the growth of the Soviet economy and to limit
Soviet military capability."8 They are cold war measures. Differences of
opinion between the United States and Western Europe over the scope of
these controls are not new, but they have become sharper and much more
public of late. It is ironic that penalties, described in the media as sanc-
tions, should be imposed by the United States on European firms which
continued to supply equipment under existing contracts for the gas pipe-
line, when blatant sanctions-breaking by U.N. members (particularly
South Africa) went unchastised in the Rhodesian case.
If measures of a negative or coercive character are to be adopted by
states without the backing of an international organization and are called
sanctions, it is surely important for western democracies to restrict them-
selves to cases where a clear norm-violation has occurred, as for instance
by Iran in 1979 and Argentina in 1982, and for the measures adopted to
be proportionate to the offense and carefully considered in terms of their
likely consequences for all who may be affected. This is particularly im-
71 The Brezhnev doctrine, enunciated after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in
1968, purported to authorize action by socialist countries to defend socialism in Eastern
Europe (and perhaps elsewhere), thereby over-riding the principle of national sovereignty,
was an extreme example of self-serving rationalization of hegemonial behavior.
7 See G. ADLER-KARLSSON, WESTERN ECONOMC WARFARE 1947-1967: A CASE STUDY IN
FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY (1968); McIntyre and Cupitt, East-West Strategic Trade Con-
trol: Crumbling Consensus? 25 SuRvay 81-108 (1980).
"The General Assembly, however, repeatedly called for the imposition of sanctions.
The United States itself imported chrome from Rhodesia under the Byrd Amendment, 50
U.S.C. §98 (h)(1)(1976) from 1971 to 1977, in violation of the Security Council's mandatory
resolutions imposing sanctions. See Diggs v. Schultz, 470 F.2d 461 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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portant for economic measures, given the range of problems which they
are now known to bring in their wake. In certain cases condemnation
without penalties may be advisable. Furthermore, condemnation and pen-
alties will gain credibility if they are taken in concert. Public argument
between allies over occasions for retaliation and over specific retaliatory
measures not only damage the alliance but also any claims to be acting in
support of principle and international law.
